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Abstract 
The years immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2007 witnessed an explosive growth in the 
supplies both of the long term securities issued by the shadow banking entities, the ABSs and CDOs, 
and of the short term securities issued by these entities, notably ABCP. While there is now some 
acknowledgment that the search for yield was the major driver of ABS and CDO growth in the US, the 
same is not true of the US ABCP market where other factors such as regulatory arbitrage on the part of 
banks or the safety and liquidity concerns of institutional investors are seen as having been the more 
important growth driving force. This paper argues that the search for yield did play a crucial role in US 
ABCP growth between 2004 and 2007. To back up this argument, the paper points to four variables that 
were closely correlated with this growth: the federal funds rate; US MMMF asset holdings; the change 
in the geographical breakdown of the institutions supplying ABCP; and, finally, the change in the 
programme breakdown of the ABCP market. 
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Introduction 
To understand the financial crisis one must above all understand the reasons why the shadow 
banking system had in the preceding period grown to a size sufficiently large as to be able to 
wreak havoc in the regular banking sector when that system collapsed in the summer of 2007. 
As concerns the explosive growth in the supplies of the long term securities issued by the 
various shadow banking entities – asset backed securities (ABSs) and collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) – there is now some acknowledgment that the major driving force behind 
this growth was the search for yield on the part of institutional investors (Cabellero,2010; 
Lysandrou, 2009,  Goda et.al, 2013, Goda and Lysandrou,2014). By contrast, there is no such 
acknowledgment as regards the equally explosive growth in the supply of short term 
securities –notably, asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) – issued by shadow banking 
entities. Although some authors (e.g. Pozsar, 2011, more on whom below) have argued that 
demand pull pressure from institutional investors played as significant a role in the pre-crisis 
growth of short term securities as in that of long term securities, they have not stretched the 
comparison to include the driving force behind this pressure: yield may have been a primary 
consideration in the case of long term securities but in the case of the short term securities 
other considerations such as those to do with safety and liquidity appear to have been far 
more important. 
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This paper will argue that the search for yield did in fact play a significant role in the growth 
of the ABCP market in the immediate pre-crisis era. To back up this argument, the paper will 
point to four developments that were peculiar to the period between mid-2004 and mid-2007. 
The first two developments, which pertain to the demand side of the ABCP market, was the 
close correlation between the rise in ABCP quantities and the rise in the federal funds rate 
and the correlation between ABCP growth and the rise in the asset holdings of the US money 
market mutual funds (MMMFs). The other two developments, which pertain to the supply 
side of the ABCP market, concern the change in the geographical breakdown of the 
institutions supplying ABCP and the change in the programme breakdown of  ABCP volume: 
where prior to 2004 it was the large US commercial banks that were the principal drivers 
behind ABCP growth, after that point it was European banks that took over this role; and 
where prior to 2004 the overwhelmingly dominant type of ABCP programmes were those 
such as ‘multi-seller’ or ‘single-seller’ programmes where credit-risk is the main risk factor 
priced into the securities backing the commercial paper issued, from that point on and up to 
mid-2007 it is ‘market value’ programmes, where market risk is the main risk factor in 
security pricing, which fuelled the volume growth of ABCP.    
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two discusses the reasons why yield 
considerations are not seen as having been key to the pre-crisis growth of the ABCP market. 
Section three explains how the search for yield pressure had built up in the long term US debt 
markets. Sections four and five explain how this same pressure spilled over into the US 
ABCP market. Section six provides a short summary and conclusion.  
 
2. Current views on the pre-crisis growth of the ABCP market. 
By the summer of 2007 the global supply of outstanding ABCP had grown to around $1.5 
trillion – the bulk of which, $1.2 trillion, was issued in the US - a striking figure when we 
consider that these financial instruments only made their appearance in the 1980s. However, 
what was also striking about the expansion of the ABCP market over the period prior to the 
outbreak of the financial crisis was the highly uneven rate of that expansion. As can be seen 
in figure 1 profiling US dollar-denominated asset-backed commercial paper, while the ABCP 
growth rate had been fairly steady over the years before 2002, that rate flattened between 
2002 and 2004 and then rose sharply between mid-2004 and mid-2007 with the result that US 
ABCP outstanding volume had more than doubled in these three years. In light of the fact 
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that it was the ABCP conduits that were the principal shadow bank entities through which the 
accumulating problems with subprime-backed securities were fed through to the regular 
banking sector with devastating consequences, it is important to know why the US ABCP 
market had expanded so quickly in so short a time span.  
Figure 1  
US ABCP outstanding volume 
 
 
Although there appear to have been suggestions that the search for yield on the part of 
institutional investors may have been the major driving force behind ABCP growth from 
2004, they have not been formulated in any systematic and empirically-backed manner thus 
leaving the field open to two other major lines of explanation for this development. The first 
of these foregrounds the role played by regulatory arbitrage on the part of the large 
commercial banks that sponsored the conduits. A good example of this type of explanation of 
ABCP growth is the paper by Acharya and Schnabl published in 2010 in which they 
“conjecture based on descriptive evidence of the regulation of ABCP conduits across 
countries, that bank risk taking was driven primarily by ‘weak’ regulation in the sense that it 
allowed banks to hold assets in conduits with little capital relative to the required capital for 
assets on bank balance sheets” (2010, p.4).  We do not find this argument convincing. 
Certainly, weak bank regulation was an important ‘enabling’ factor in the growth of ABCP 
inasmuch as the commercial banks were hardly likely to have been as willing to create or 
sponsor ABCP conduits on the scale that they did had these off-balance sheet vehicles been 
subject to the same tight capital requirement constraints as applied to on-balance sheet assets. 
However, the uneven rate of ABCP growth illustrated in figure 1 puts in serious doubt the 
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stronger claim that regulatory arbitrage on the part of the commercial banks was the main 
‘motivating’ factor behind that growth.  
Acharya and Schnabl argue that while the threat of a tightening of the regulation concerning 
off-balance sheet vehicles in the wake of the Enron scandal served to dampen ABCP growth 
between 2002 and 2004, the subsequent evaporation of this threat led to resumed ABCP 
growth after 2004.  This argument may appear to tally with the observed pattern of ABCP 
growth over the twenty year period prior to the crisis in that there appears to be a correlation 
between the ‘go-stop-go’ phases of ABCP growth on the one hand and the ‘weak-strong-
weak’ phases of regulation on the other. However, the argument does not tally with the 
significant quantitative differences between the two ‘go’ phases of ABCP growth: how can 
‘weak’ regulation explain a doubling of US ABCP stocks from around $600 billion to $1.2 
trillion in the second ‘go’ phase spanning a mere three years between end-2004 and mid-2007 
when in the first ‘go’ phase spanning over a ten year period before 2002 weak regulation was 
accompanied by a far more slow, albeit steady, rate of ABCP expansion? Clearly, something 
more than weak regulation is needed to fill this explanatory gap. 
For this something more, it is necessary to look at what was happening on the demand side of 
the ABCP market in the years prior to the crisis. One author who has done so is Pozsar who 
published a paper in 2011 in which he argued that demand-pull pressure from institutional 
investors, not regulatory arbitrage on the part of the banks, was the major driver of pre-crisis 
ABCP growth. Pozsar’s line of argument basically breaks down as follows: (i) the growth of 
institutional cash pools (cash held by an assortment of institutions including corporations and 
pension and mutual funds), a growth fuelled by a variety of factors (such as the globalisation 
of corporations, the growth of institutional asset management and the growth of income and 
wealth inequality), inevitably brought with it a corresponding demand for safe, short term 
assets in which the accumulating amounts of cash could be stored; (ii) faced with a shortage 
of banks across which institutional cash pools could be spread in insured, $100,000 
increments (the deposit insurance limit), institutional investors could have simply lent the 
cash to banks and thus become their unsecured creditors but instead chose the more rational, 
because more safe, option of investing in what Pozsar terms “insured deposit alternatives” i.e. 
short term securities; (iii) due to the increasing shortage of the safest short term securities, 
namely, US treasury bills (a problem caused primarily by the increases in foreign central 
banks’ holdings of these securities for exchange rate management purposes)  institutional 
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investors had to divert substantial portions of their cash pools into a range of privately 
guaranteed instruments, including ABCP, issued by the shadow banking system. 
Although Pozsar stretched the demand-side story of pre-crisis shadow banking growth to 
include the growth of the short term liabilities of this sector in addition to that of  the sector’s 
long term liabilities, he stopped short of stretching the comparison to include the subject of 
yield: in his view, the search for yield may have been the chief motivating factor behind 
institutional investors’ demand for the ABSs and the CDOs issued by shadow bank entities, 
but in the case of ABCP and other short term instruments it was safety and liquidity alone 
that were the overriding considerations in the minds of these investors. To quote Pozsar: the 
“rationale for institutional cash pools’ aversion to bank deposits, together with the 
identification of the structural ‘deficit’ of short-term government guaranteed instruments 
refutes (his emphasis) the argument that the primary reason behind institutional cash pools’ 
holdings of privately insured deposit alternatives was yield. It was not, as on one and three 
month tenors, these alternatives yielded less than negotiable CD’s, and while they yielded 
more than short-term government guaranteed instruments, they were not held for yield 
reasons but because there was an insufficient supply of short-term government guaranteed 
instruments. This shortage naturally pushed cash pools toward relatively high yielding 
alternatives to bills that were still low yielding relative to uninsured CD’s.” (2011, p.11) 
Two objections to this argument can be made, one on logical grounds and the other on 
empirical grounds.  Pozsar contradicts himself when he states that had yield been a primary 
consideration in the short-term investments of institutional investors they would have 
diverted more, if not all, of their cash into uninsured CDs: for apart from the fact that CDs are 
not exactly the most liquid type of short term security (the offer of relatively high yields on 
CDs is precisely contingent on the fact that they cannot be cashed in before the redemption 
date without incurring a heavy penalty) this statement also prompts the question as to how the 
banks could have increased their supplies of CDs in the amounts needed to accommodate 
institutional cash pools while at the same time maintaining the high credit rating and safety 
record of these instruments.  The empirically based objection concerns the uneven pattern of 
ABCP growth in the pre-crisis period. While Acharya and Schnabl at least try to address this 
issue in their regulatory arbitrage version of ABCP growth, Pozsar by contrast simply ignores 
it. Yet if safety and liquidity are the only two considerations uppermost in institutional 
investors’ minds when buying short term instruments, then one has to explain, firstly, why 
the steady increase in the rate of US ABCP growth before 2002 is followed by a break in 
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continuity in that rate between 2002 and 2004 and, secondly, why that episode is then 
followed by a suddenly acceleration in ABCP growth between 2004 and 2007.  Given that 
there was an unbroken trend increase in the size of institutional cash pools over this entire 
period, it follows that a third consideration, in addition to those of safety and liquidity, had to 
have played a key role in institutional investors’ decisions as to when and as to how much to 
invest in ABCP. That third consideration was the investor search for yield.  Before 
elaborating on this point, we must look, first, at the reason why the search for yield pressure 
had built up in all of the major the US bond markets and, second, at the reasons why this 
development has been, with some few exceptions, overlooked by economists. 
 
3. The search for yield pressure in the US bond markets in the pre-crisis era. 
Bonds perform two important functions in the contemporary era: on the one side, they serve 
as a type of financing instrument and, on the other side, they serve as a type of investable.  
The financing function is the only one that matters for the governments, banks and 
corporations issuing bonds, for which reason they are only concerned with the ‘flow’ 
dimension of these securities: they raise funds through the issuance of bonds on the promise 
to repay the funds at some future date and in the meantime they use the funds for investment 
or other expenditure purposes. By contrast, it is the second function of bonds that is of crucial 
importance to insurance companies, pension funds and other large institutional investors who 
now dominate the buy side of the capital markets. For this reason they need to be concerned 
as much with the ‘stock’ or quantity dimension of bonds as much as with their flow 
dimension: they give sums of money when purchasing bonds in the expectation of being 
repaid at some future date, but in the meantime they need to use these bonds as value 
containers into which clients’ monies can be poured and from which monies can be extracted 
to repay clients1. 
As bonds have no intrinsic value, it follows that they can only fulfil their value storage 
function for investors when their prices are maintained at a stable level over time. Thus if an 
excess demand for bonds as stores of value emerges, the solution to the problem cannot be 
through a price adjustment process as this would undermine their value storage property and 
would thus be self-defeating but must instead be through a quantity adjustment process: more 
                                                          
1 For further discussion of the two fold nature and function of bonds and other financial securities see 
Lysandrou (2013; 2016). 
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bonds need to be supplied to soak up the excess demand thereby keeping their prices and 
yields stable and thus their value storage property secure. However, if for whatever reason the 
rate of supply of government and corporate bonds cannot keep up with the rate of investor 
demand for them, then it must fall to the banks and their off-balance sheet vehicles to create 
the extra volumes of debt securities to bridge the gap2.  That it was precisely this kind of 
situation which prevailed in the US in the immediate pre-crisis era would appear to be 
supported by the following facts: a sharp increase in foreign and domestic demand for US 
treasury, municipal and corporate bonds from about end-2001, see figure 2;  a corresponding 
decline in the yields on all of these US debt securities after 2001, see figure 3; a steep 
increase in the rates of supply of ABS and CDOs from about 2003, see figures 4 and 5. 
Figure 2 
Source: Goda et.al. (2013 
 
                                                          
2 For further discussion of the security production function of the shadow banking system see 
Lysandrou and Nesvetailova (2015) 
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Figure 3 
US bond yields 1990-2007 
 
Source: Goda et.al. (2013) 
Figure 4 
Issuance of asset backed securities, 2007-2007 
 
Source: Bank of England (2007 
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Figure 5 
Issuance of CDOS, mid-2003 to mid-2007 
 
Source: Borio (2008) 
We have noted that some mainstream economists, most notably Riccardo Caballero at MIT, 
pointed to a global excess demand for safe stores of value as having been a major driving 
force behind the pre-crisis growth of structured financial securities. However, this remains 
very much a minority position because the central assumptions of dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models, which are now the major macroeconomic models used for 
policy guidance purposes, simply do not allow for the emergence of an excess demand for 
bonds as stores of value. Alongside firms, the only other representative type of agents in 
DSGE models are households. As households do not market asset portfolios to the public as 
do pension funds and other institutional investors, they have no reason to treat securities as 
portable value containers in which clients’ monies are stored, and thus no reason to view 
securities differently from the way that they are viewed by firms: just as firms borrow funds 
for investment purposes on the promise to repay the funds at some point in the future, 
households lend funds in the expectation of being repaid those funds with an added return 
that can be used to finance future consumption. The upshot is that as there are no agents who 
are concerned with the quantitative, value storage dimension of bonds and who thus need 
bond prices to be stable so as to safeguard this quantitative dimension, DSGE models see 
prices as performing the same equilibrating role in the securities markets as they do in the 
product markets. If, for example, households seek better returns from securities than are 
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available on their bank deposits their prices will go up and yields go down thus encouraging 
firms to issue more securities to finance investment. Conversely, to take another example, if 
firms issue more securities for investment purposes than are currently demanded, their prices 
will have to fall and yields rise so as entice the required extra household demand for 
securities. As excess demands for securities can never be more than a temporary phenomenon 
due to the equilibrating role of prices, it follows that the demand side of the securities 
markets can never be a source of pressure on the banking sector to create extra quantities of 
asset-backed securities to compensate for any shortfall in the supplies of debt securities 
issued by corporations. What of course then follows from viewing the financial crisis from 
this standpoint is that it was the various failures on the part of the banks and on the part of 
other institutions connected to them that were chiefly to blame for the growth of the toxic  
securities that triggered the crisis.  
Heterodox accounts of the financial crisis differ radically from those of the mainstream in 
that where the latter see agency and institutional failures as having arisen out of gaps in an 
otherwise sound macroeconomic policy framework, the former see these failures as the direct 
product of the neo-liberal orientation of the contemporary policy framework. This said, there 
is one issue regarding the crisis on which there is a correspondence of position: this is that 
heterodox accounts similarly do not give causal significance in the crisis to an excess demand 
for securities because the assumptions of heterodox theory similarly do not allow for the 
emergence of such an excess demand problem3. Consider, by way of example, post-
Keynesian stock-flow models, now generally considered to be the most advanced and 
comprehensive type of heterodox macroeconomic model. Although these models take the 
aggregate sector rather than the rational choice maximising agent as their basic unit of 
analysis, they nevertheless collapse the institutional asset management industry into the 
household sector rather than separate it out as a sector in its own right4. As households have 
no reason to view financial securities differently from the way that they are viewed by 
corporate issuers, it follows that it is only the capacity of securities as financing instruments 
                                                          
3 For a fuller critique of post-Keynesian stock-flow models along these lines see Lysandrou (2014) 
4 Although some post-Keynesian stock-flow models include a separate ‘rentier’ sector (see e.g. van 
Treeck (2009) they also only highlight the financing function of securities. Rentiers differ from 
households in that they draw their incomes from rental profits rather than from wages, and they differ 
from corporations in that they invest less in long term productive activities than in short term 
speculative ventures. However, as rentiers only operate in their own individual interests, unlike 
institutional asset managers who market asset portfolios to the public, they too have no reason to view 
securities differently to the way that they are by viewed by their corporate or government issuers. 
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that is of importance in these models. Securities may serve as stocks from which funds flow 
at the start of a given period and to which they return at the end of that period, but in between 
these two points in time securities are not thought to serve as portable investables, assets 
whose value storage property is as important throughout the trading period as it is at the 
beginning and end of that period. As a consequence of the omission of an institutional 
investor perspective on securities, post-Keynesian macro models end up depicting the 
financial markets as the one group of markets that operate to an equilibrating, price 
adjustment rule rather than to a quantity adjustment rule. Thus to quote Godley and Lavioe:  
“with trivial exceptions, there are no equilibria (or disequilibria) outside financial markets” 
(2006, p.2); “market clearing through prices does not usually occur except in financial 
markets” (2012, p.18)). Now if the bond markets, along with those for other financial 
securities, always clear automatically through price adjustments, it must follow, when 
applying this perspective to the pre-crisis growth of the US ABS and CDO markets in 
particular, that that growth could not have possibly been powered by an excess investor 
demand for bonds spilling over from the US government, corporate and municipal bond 
markets. Rather, the central impetus behind the banking system’s creation of extra quantities 
of ABSs and CDOs must have derived from the various failures within the system itself. 
While we consider heterodox explanations of the financial crisis to be generally superior to 
those of the mainstream, we also consider these explanations to be incomplete. If failures on 
the supply side of the ABS and CDO markets were sufficient to explain their pre-crisis 
growth, we should have expected that growth to have registered a trend rate of increase over 
a far longer stretch of time than was actually the case. The fact that well over a half of the US 
ABS and CDO stocks outstanding in mid-2007 had been created in the previous three years, 
combined with the fact that the steep increase in these stocks coincided exactly with the steep 
increase in foreign and domestic investor demand for yield bearing securities, would indicate 
the crucial importance of demand pull pressures in driving pre-crisis ABS and CDO growth. 
The same caveat applies to the US ABCP market. The fact that over a half of the $1.2 trillion 
worth of ABCP outstanding in mid-2007 had been created in the previous three years give 
strong indication that the bulk of these short term securities had been created to accommodate 
the excess demand for yield spilling over from the long term debt markets. The next section 
begins to flesh out the details of this argument. 
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4. The pre-crisis growth of the ABCP market: the demand-side perspective 
The rapid expansion in US conforming and non-conforming mortgage loans, the raw material 
needed for ABSs and cash CDOs, was to some degree facilitated by the easing of US 
monetary policy following the end of the dot.com boom. From 6.5% in late 2000, the federal 
funds rate fell to 1% in June 2003 where it remained until June 2004. However, just as the 
low short term interest rate period gave boost to mortgage lending, that boost in turn helped 
to usher in a period of high short term interests when the federal reserve, concerned about the 
possible inflationary consequences of increased consumer spending fuelled in part by the 
wealth effects of rising house prices, raised the federal funds rate by a quarter percent at a 
time in seventeen consecutive steps starting in June 2004. In preceding periods of monetary 
policy tightening, such as in 1988-9, 1994-5 and 1999-2000, the yield on 10-year Treasuries 
kept track with the target federal funds rate. On this occasion, however, it did not. What was 
already unusual is that while the policy rate fell by 5.5% between 2001and 2004 the yield on 
10-year Treasuries fell by only 3.57 %, from 6.77% to 3.2%; even more unusual, however, 
was that while the policy rate rose by 4.25% to 5.25% between mid-2004 and mid-2007, the 
yield on 10-year Treasuries rose by only 2% over the same period, to 5.2% (see figure 6) a 
development that caused Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, to talk of a bond 
yield conundrum in his congressional testimony in February, 2005. Conundrum or not, the 
fact that the short term rate remained above the long term rate for much of the 2005-2007 
period made it inevitable that institutional investors would look to the commercial paper 
market as a supplementary means of satisfying their need for yield. 
Figure 6 
US long and short term interest rates, 1990-2007 
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The US market for short term commercial paper basically comprises three segments: those 
for financial commercial paper, non-financial commercial paper and asset-backed 
commercial paper. The ABCP segment is the youngest of the three, having only been 
established in the 1980’s. It also remained the smallest in size right up to the early 2000s 
when the situation started to change, first gradually as the ABCP segment began to match the 
other segments and then rapidly between 2004 and mid-2007 when it became by this latter 
point in time the largest segment accounting for over 60% of all US commercial paper ($1.2 
trillion out a total of $2 trillion). What is interesting is that there was absolutely no relation 
between the federal funds rate between and the rate of US ABCP growth up to about 2002: 
that growth continued at an even rate regardless of the sharp up and down movements in the 
federal funds rate. However, the situation changed radically from 2002 onwards: the ABCP 
supply rate stays flat with the fall in the federal funds rate between 2002 and 2004 and 
subsequently rises in line with the rise in the federal funds rate between 2004 and 2007.  This 
development gives the first indication that it was the strength of investor demand for yield 
that was the chief cause of the sudden acceleration in the rate of ABCP supply. The second, 
and even more convincing, indication that this was the case is given by the data on the US 
money market mutual funds, the major intermediary vehicles through which institutional 
investor demand for yield was fed through into the commercial paper market.  
MMMFs first emerged in the US in the early 1970s to exploit the opportunity offered by the 
regulatory cap on the interest that banks could pay on deposits. As the cap was set at a rate 
below money market yields, the MMMFs provided households with a profitable alternative to 
bank deposits in that while offering the same level of safety (MMMFs invest only in such 
short term assets as to be able to maintain a stable value of $1 per share) they at the same 
time provide money market linked yields to clients. However, while regulatory arbitrage was 
the main driver of US MMMF growth as measured by net asset holdings up until the mid-
1990s this thereafter ceased to be the case as interest rate regulation was abolished in 1984 
and interstate bank restrictions were lifted in 1994. Rather, the main driver of MMMF growth 
from this time on was the institutionalisation of this industry’s client base as shown in figure 
7.  
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Figure 7  
 
Retail and Institutional MMMF Assets in USD bn (right scale) 
Share in total assets in % (left scale) 
 
 
 
‘Retail MMMFs’, which cater to small household investors, were the predominant investor 
type up to the late 1990s, but after that date it is ‘institutional MMMs’, which cater to large 
investors such as corporations, pension funds and insurance companies, that become the 
predominant type. The major reason for the popularity of MMMFs with institutional 
investors is that, with the continuing growth in the volumes of cash held by these investors, 
MMMFs offered a convenient and economically efficient way of storing large amounts of 
this cash in a safe and liquid form.  This said, the fact that yield considerations in addition to 
those of safety and liquidity were another major reason for the popularity of MMMFs 
becomes clear if we focus on the historical process by which institutional MMMFs gained 
ascendency over retail MMMFs. As can be seen in figure 7, that process breaks down into 
three distinct phases: (a) the phase between 1996 and 2002 when the share of institutional 
MMMFs in total MMMF assets was rising rapidly; (b) the phase between 2002 and 2004 
when the share of institutional MMMFs continued to rise but at a much slower rate; and (c) 
the phase between 2004 and 2007 when the share of institutional MMMF again rose at a 
relatively high rate. 
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The most striking outcome of the ‘institutionalisation’ of the MMMF client base is that from 
about 2000, the critical point at which the assets of institutional MMMFs begin to 
predominate over those held by retail MMMFs, changes in the overall size of this sector as 
measured by its total assets begin to mirror the changes in the federal funds rate as can be 
seen in figure 8. The explanation for this phenomenon essentially comes down to the fact that 
institutional investor demand for MMMF services is far more sensitive to money market rates 
than is the demand exercised by household investors. For households the relevant short term 
asset choice is between bank deposits and MMMF holdings, and as long as the yields 
delivered by MMMFs exceed the interests on bank deposits, households will not withdraw 
funds from the MMMFs. This is why there is no correlation between the size of MMMF 
assets and the federal funds rate in the period before the late 1990s when retail MMMFs were 
predominant. By contrast, the relevant asset choice for institutional investors such as pension 
funds and insurance companies is not only between different types of short term investments 
(e.g. between direct holdings of T-bills, corporate commercial paper, CDs and so on and 
indirect holdings of these instruments via MMMF investments) but also between short and 
long term investments (e.g between holding shares in MMMFs and holding bonds and 
equities). The point is that for many of the large institutional asset managers, holding stocks 
of cash is a necessary part of the portfolio management process in that these stocks fill in the 
gaps between the sales and purchases of long term securities in addition to meeting any other 
liquidity needs. A further point, however, is that the amounts of these interim cash holdings 
will tend to fall when short term interest rates are low relative to long term rates in that only 
the minimum amount needed for liquidity purposes will be held as the yield factor declines in 
importance, while the amounts of interim cash stocks will tend to rise when short term rates 
are high relative to the long term rates in that more cash will be held than is usually needed 
with the excess amount being directed into short term instruments to take advantage of the 
high yield on them. This is why, as we say and as is made clear in figure 8, changes in the 
rate of MMMF asset growth exactly match changes in the federal funds rate from about 2000 
on when institutional MMMFs become dominant.  
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Figure 8 
MMMF assets (left scale); Feds fund rate (right scale) 
 
 
With the above points in mind, we can begin to understand what happened between 2004 and 
2007 in the US ABCP market. Given the increased inflows of cash from institutional 
investors seeking to benefit from the rise in short term yields after 2004, the MMMFs 
obviously had to find equivalent amounts of short term securities to accommodate these 
inflows. Furthermore, given that US treasury bills were in short supply for the reasons 
specified above, the MMMFs were forced to resort to short term financial assets supplied by 
the private sector. Although MMMFs increased their overall holdings of commercial paper in 
the immediate pre-crisis period, it is clear from figure 9 showing total commercial paper 
issuance that it was the ABCP segment of the commercial paper market that was by far the 
most responsive to MMMF demand. The reason why the other segments were less responsive 
is that the supplies of financial and non-financial commercial paper are ultimately determined 
not only by the amount of debt that the issuing bank and non-bank corporations wish to carry 
but also by the structure of that debt. In light of the continuing fall in long term interest rates 
while short term rates continued to rise between 2004 and 2007, many fund raising 
corporations chose to lock into the low long term rates by issuing more bonds and cutting 
back on their issuance of commercial paper. Thus faced with an increasing shortage of 
financial and non-financial commercial paper relative to the amounts needed to accommodate 
their institutional clients’ need for yield, the MMMFs had little option but to turn to the 
shadow banking system, and to its conduits in particular, to make good the shortfall.  
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Figure 9 
Commercial Paper Issuances- Jannuary 2004-December 2009 (monthly averages) 
 
 
To summarise, the rapid growth of the US ABS and CDO markets in the pre-crisis era and 
the equally rapid growth of the US ABCP market in the same era are not two different stories 
so much as two sides of the same story concerning the reach for yield. This said, there is one 
important feature that distinguishes the two sides of the story, namely, that pertaining to the 
geographical origin of the shadow bank entities that mass produced the yield bearing 
securities. While the special purpose entities (SPEs) and the structural investment vehicles 
(SIV’s)  responsible for the long term securities remained predominantly US in origin right 
up to the outbreak of the subprime crisis, the same was not true of the ABCP conduits. In 
their case, the US domination that had prevailed ever since their inception in the 1980s gave 
way to European domination after 2002. An explanation for this development is given in the 
next section. 
 
5. The pre-crisis growth of the ABCP market: the supply-side perspective 
In addition to the doubling in the size of the global ABCP market between 2004 and 2007, 
there were two other notable developments in this market over the same period. The first was 
the change in the geographical and functional breakdown of the institutions sponsoring the 
ABCP conduits.  That fact that of the $1.5 trillion worth of ABCP outstanding at mid-2007 
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$1.2 trillion were dollar-denominated paper issued in the US does not mean that that the 
majority of the sponsoring institutions were US domiciled. In fact, the contrary was the case 
for as shown in figure 10  it was European domiciled commercial banks that, having taken 
over the number one spot in ABCP production from the US banks by about 2002, then 
became the driving force behind the accelerated rate of ABCP production from mid-2004 
through to mid-2007. The parallel development over the same period was the notable increase 
in the percentage share of non-bank institutions in global ABCP supply. Where ABCP 
conduits sponsored by non-bank financial institutions had accounted for approximately $100 
billlion of the $700 billion of global ABCP oustanding at end 2004 (i.e.about 14% of the 
total), by mid-2007 they accounted for some $400 billion out of the global stock of ABCP of 
$1.5 trillion then outstanding (i.e. about 28% of the total) 
Figure 10 
 Global ABCP outstanding by region 
 
Source: Arteta et.al (2013) 
 
Taken individually, no European country’s banks, not even those of Germany, could quite 
match those of the US in terms of the percentage share of US ABCP supply. This said, it is 
nevertheless remarkable that the aggregate percentage share of the European banks should have 
been substantially above that of the US banks when we consider that the contemporaneous 
European contribution to supplies of ABSs and CDOs was almost negligible: of the $ 11 trillion 
ABSs and $3 trillion CDOs outstanding in mid-2007 the European banking sector accounted 
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for a mere 17% of both amounts (Goda et.al, 2013). Aside from the absence of any tradition in 
securitisation, the major reason for the discrepancy between the European banks’ minor 
contribution to ABS and CDO issuance on the one hand and their major contribution to ABCP 
issuance on the other essentially boils down to the different construction requirements needed 
by these different types of debt securities. The short term and typically non-tradable nature of 
ABCP means that these instruments are relatively easy to construct as compared with ABSs 
that, as long term instruments, require more legal paperwork if they are to be capable of being 
traded away from the initial conditions of issuance. The difference in technical difficulty and 
complexity is even more pronounced in the case of CDOs given that the inclusion of securitised 
subprime mortgage loans in the mixture of backing collateral entails the use of sophisticated 
credit enhancement techniques (CETs) to make these products in any way viable as investable 
assets. Thus when the institutional demand for short term paper began to expand rapidly from 
mid-2004, the European banks were well able to join with their US counterparts in 
accommodating this expansion.  
A further clue pointing to the importance of yield pull pressure in the pre-crisis growth of the 
US ABCP market concerns the programme breakdown of the market. These programmes 
broadly divide into those where credit loans form the major collateral behind ABCP issuance, 
the principal ones being multi-seller, single seller and loan-backed programmes, and those 
where securities are the major backing collateral, the principal programmes here being 
securities arbitrage, hybrid (that combine multi-seller and securities arbitrage characteristics) 
and SIV. It is noteworthy that where in mid-2001 the three major credit loan backed 
programmes accounted for 77.1% of all ABCP outstanding at that point, by mid-2007 their 
percentage share had fallen to 62.8% while the share of the three major securities backed 
programmes rose from 21.3% to 32.8% over the same period, see figure 11. This 
development in a sense mirrored what was happening at the same time in the CDO market.  
Despite the high rate of supply of cash CDOs after 2002, this rate was still not enough to 
satisfy the rapid rise in demand for yield, which is why from about 2004 it was synthetic 
CDOs that became the dominant component of total CDO stocks ($2 trillion out of $3 trillion 
by mid-2007).  Unlike cash CDOs that take months to be created because they require the 
physical involvement of household borrowers and of the commercial banks that lend to them 
in their creation, synthetic CDOs take only a few days to be established in that they involve 
nothing other than the use of credit default swaps.  A similar situation appeared to arise in the 
ABCP market from about mid-2004 in that while the loan backed programmes continued to 
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carry the major burden of ABCP supply, the high rate of demand for these products combined 
with the limits to the amounts of loans that could be mustered as collateral in the time needed 
meant that securities backed programmes, which could be launched more quickly, had to be 
called upon to help carry the burden. The problem that arose, of course, is that in purchasing 
ABSs and cash CDOs to use as collateral in ABCP issuance, the US and European bank 
sponsored conduits only served to further aggravate the already acute supply shortages of 
these products. 
Figure 11 
 
 
Source: Ahern ( 2007) 
From the above we can see why the US and European commercial banking sectors took such 
a massive hit from their conduits when the subprime crisis finally broke out in full force on 
August 9th 2007, the day when the French bank BNP Paribus announced that it could not 
value the structured financial securities held by three of its hedge funds. Up to that fateful 
announcement, the ABCP yield premium over the treasury bill rate had averaged between 8-
10 basis points but within 24 hours of that announcement the yield premium had jumped to 
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150 basis points. The fact that some buyers of ABCP were only willing to roll over short term 
loans at unusually high rates was bad enough, but what then made matters far worse was that 
many other buyers simply refused to roll over loans at any price thus forcing banks to take 
their conduits’ assets back on to their balance sheets. Ideally, the investors in ABCP should 
have distinguished between those conduits who mainly held conventional loans and securities 
as backing collateral from those who had mainly held what turned out to be the highly toxic 
CDOs. That this was not possible in practice largely came down to the fact that, owing to the 
highly complex and opaque nature of CDOs, investors could not easily ascertain which 
conduits were exposed to these securities and to what extent and thus simply went for the safe 
option of withdrawing funds from all of them.  
 
6. Summary and conclusion 
This paper has argued that the search for yield was the major driving force behind the 
explosive growth of the US ABCP market between 2004 and 2007. This argument by no 
means contradicts the argument that the banks sponsoring the conduits had both the 
opportunity (the exploitation of lax bank regulation) and the incentive (the exploitation of 
maturity mismatches) to boost their supply of US ABCP during this period. What it does call 
into question is the much stronger argument that profit seeking regulatory arbitrage on the 
part of the banks remained the primary driving force behind ABCP supply right up to the 
outbreak of the subprime crisis in the summer of 2007. To put this argument is to beg a 
number of pressing questions. Why did the sudden acceleration in ABCP supply not occur 
before June 2004 when the yield differential between long and short term US securities was 
substantially higher thus offering substantially greater profit opportunities for the banks? 
Why did the European banks, who always found it much easier to issue ABCP as compared 
with ABSs and CDOs, wait until after June 2004 to boost their supply of this paper?  And 
why was it that the percentage share of securities backed ABCP programmes only rose 
substantially after June 2004 and not before this date?  
The only plausible answer to all of these questions is that the banks could not increase their 
rate of ABCP supply before June 2004, and thus did not need to depend more heavily on 
securities backed programmes to overcome the limits on credit loan backed programmes, 
simply because at that time there was no corresponding increase in the level of ABCP 
demand from institutional MMMFs. On the contrary, the same set of circumstances offering 
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banks the opportunity to profit handsomely from expanding ABCP supply before June 2004 
were also precisely those deterring institutional MMMFs from redirecting their demand for 
short term securities away from other types of commercial paper and towards ABCP. It was 
only when short term rates rose relative to the long term rates, a development which the 
opposing effects of stimulating MMMF demand for short term paper while at the same time 
constraining the rate of supply of corporate commercial paper issuance, that the MMMFs 
were forced to turn to the bank owned conduits to make good the shortfall in supply though 
increased ABCP issuance. In short, the pre-crisis explosive growth of the US ABCP market 
makes sense only if the pressures of investor demand for yield, channelled through the 
MMMFs, are given causal significance. 
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